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1. Preamble.
Should philosophy be content to describe the actual structure of our thought and talk, or should it 
be concerned with producing a better structure?  Put another way, should philosophy be in the 1
business of giving a theory of our ordinary, everyday concepts or should it also be in the business of 
producing new and better concepts with which to build a theory of the world and our place in it? At 
the extreme right-wing, is Conceptual Conservatism, the view that our everyday concepts are 
perfectly in order as they are: philosophy should leave everything just as it is.  In the centre-left, is 2
Conceptual Explication, the view that our everyday concepts are typically too rough-hewn as they 
stand to feature in rigorous philosophical theory. Such concepts need dressing and polishing if they 
are to be fit for the building of theory.  At the extreme left, is Conceptual Marxism, the view that 3
many (if not most) of our ordinary concepts are, for various reasons, unfit for bearing the load of 
useful philosophical explanations. Such concepts should be removed—at least in the regions where 
they prove to be troublesome or defective. The purpose of philosophy, on such a view, is not to 
merely interpret our concepts but to replace them.4
Kevin Scharp is a Conceptual Marxist of a rather extreme kind. In Replacing Truth (2013), the 
concept of truth is taken to be fundamentally incoherent.  As such, Scharp reckons it to be unsuited 5
for systematic philosophical theorising and in need of replacement—at least for regions of thought 
 Cf. Strawson (1959, p. 9).1
 Even if it turns out that our ordinary concepts are the source of all philosophical paradox. The 2
most extreme exemplar of this view is Wittgenstein (1953) I.124; see also I.133.
 See Carnap (1950). Haslanger (2006, pp. 95-6) takes her “ameliorative project” to be offering 3
Carnapian explications of gender and race concepts.
 Conceptual Marxists include Tarski (1936, 1944) and Scharp (2013) on truth, and Schiffer (1996) 4
and Weiner (2009) on knowledge.
 All page references are to this book. See also Scharp (2007, 2012). Scharp speaks of “conceptual 5
inconsistency” rather than “conceptual incoherence”. I use the latter expression here and below as it 
can cover a broader range of views including the view whereby the constitutive principles of 
incoherent concepts do not entail any false proposition, but merely some proposition which is not 
assertible.
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and talk which permit liar sentences and their ilk to be formulated.  This replacement methodology 6
is radical because it not only recommends that the concept of truth be replaced (in troublesome 
domains) but that the word “true” be replaced too. Only Tarski has attempted anything like it 
before.  In assessing Replacing Truth below, a lot of what I have to say concerns the credentials of the 7
replacement methodology on offer, though I also connect various features of this methodology to 
the details of Scharp’s own solution to the liar paradox. My goals are four-fold: to summarise the 
many components of Scharp’s theory of truth; to highlight what I take to be some of the excess 
baggage carried by the view; to assess whether, and to what extent, the extreme methodology on 
offer is at all called for; finally, to briefly propose a less radical replacement strategy for resolving 
the liar paradox. To keep things focussed, I have organised the main discussion around a set of 
problems/questions.  8
2. Scharp's Theory of Truth: The Thumbnail Version.
Scharp’s theory of truth has many interlocking parts, which can be summarised as follows:
(a) Truth is an incoherent concept; the liar paradox demonstrates this (Ch. 3-4, esp. 57-62).9
(b) A concept is incoherent if and only if its constitutive principles (jointly) have false consequences. 
As such, one or more or these constitutive principles must be false (pp. 36-43).
Cartoon Exemplar One: (i) “is an oldster” applies to x if x > 60, (ii) “is not an oldster” applies to x if x 
< 65. So, consider Charlie who is 62. The constitutive principles for “oldster” entail that Charlie is an 
oldster and that Charlie is not an oldster. So, they entail something necessarily false—a 
contradiction.   
 Eklund (2002) also takes the concept of truth to be incoherent but does not recommend 6
replacement. Equally, Dummett (1975) thinks that vagueness infects language with a kind of 
incoherence but holds that such incoherence is irremediable—we just have to live with it.
 See, e.g., Tarski (1944, §14) on his hypothetical world congress on “frue” and “true”. Confession: I 7
found it a pity that the connections and differences between Tarski and Scharp did not get discussed 
in Replacing Truth.    
 Replacing Truth is novel, ambitious, broad in scope, packed with arguments and insights, 8
technically adept, timely, important, and clearly written. I cannot hope to evaluate the myriad 
features of the view here. Nonetheless, I hope to have put my finger on its many virtues and, what I 
take to be, its main vices.
 That truth is an incoherent concept was first proposed by Tarski (1933, 1944). More recent 9
proponents include Yablo (1993a, 1993b), Ludwig (2001), Badici and Ludwig (2007), Eklund (2002a, 
2002b, 2005, 2007), Patterson (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009); cf. Priest (1979, 2006). See Scharp (2013, ch. 5) 
for relevant discussion.
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Cartoon Exemplar Two: (i) “is a blair” applies to x if x is a chair, (ii) “is not a blair” applies to x if x is 
blue. The constitutive principles for “blair” entail something contingently false: that there are no 
blue chairs (cf. Scharp's term “rable”, p. 36).10
(c) A principle p is constitutive for a concept C if and only if competence with C entitles one to accept 
p (or would entitle one to accept p when there is no countervailing evidence), (pp. 46-7).11
(d) The central constitutive principle for truth is the T-schema: a sentence S (which says that p) is 
true if and only if p, (p. 16, pp. 62-3). (The corresponding rules of truth-introduction and truth-
elimination are just as central.) 
(e) This schema is an incoherent constitutive principle: it entails a contradiction when applied to the 
liar sentence L, where L = “L is not true” (given a suitably powerful logic such as intuitionistic or 
classical logic) (pp. 99-100).
(f) The standard liar paradox is blocked because the T-schema is taken to be (in some sense) invalid 
(p. 101).
(g) Without the T-schema, the predicate “is true” cannot function as a (general) device for 
endorsement and rejection (pp. 62-64).  12
(h) So, Scharp concludes, the concepts of truth is severely defective and must be replaced (Ch. 5, 
esp. pp. 137-145).
(i) Moreover, the truth-predicate must be replaced too: we must learn not to use “true” anymore (at 
least for the scientifically respectable fragments of the language in which the liar paradox can be 
formulated), (pp. 142-143, pp. 275-277).
 Scharp (pp. 37-8) additionally offers a non-cartoon candidate incoherent concept, namely mass (as 10
employed in Newtonian mechanics). Such a concept was replaced by two concepts: proper mass and 
relativistic mass (which, despite their names, are not to be seen as kinds of mass).    
 Here the notion of entitlement is an externalist, species of default warrant of the kind sponsored 11
by Burge (1992). The qualifier “would entitle one to accept p when there is no countervailing 
evidence” is included in order to address the worry that once exposed to the liar paradox we obtain 
a conclusive defeater for being entitled to accept the T-schema (assuming the credentials of the logic 
employed are not in question). One worry with such a weakened view of constitutive principles is 
that a competent subject need have no disposition to accept a constitutive principle for truth—but 
then we lose a general account as to why the liar paradox is so seductive. Eklund’s conception of 
constitutive principles, in contrast, entails that a speaker is disposed to accept the constitutive 
principle as true which provides him with an explanation as to why the paradox exerts what he 
terms “pull” (see Eklund 2002a).
 Here the thought is that the truth predicate has two broad functions. Suppose I decide to endorse 12
something that you said when we met yesterday at Noon but I cannot remember exactly what it 
was that you said. The truth-predicate allows me to say (or just merely believe) the following: what 
you said yesterday at Noon is true. This counts as an indirect endorsement of what you said. Likewise, 
if I want to indirectly reject what you said I can say or believe: what you said at Noon was not true.
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(j) Crucially, truth is not to be replaced with a single new concept. That is, a Mono-Replacement 
Strategy is not called for because the replacement concept would be too weak to be both consistent 
and equipped to take on the functional role of truth (p. 148). Rather, truth is to be replaced with two 
concepts which each divide up the main functional roles of truth between them: a Bi-Replacement 
Strategy (p. 149).
(k) The replacement concepts are: descending truth and ascending truth. The replacement theory is 
thus the combined theory of ascending and descending truth (ADT), (pp. 149-154). 
(l) The (central) constitutive principle for descending truth is the following disquotational principle: 
If a sentence S (which says that p) is descending true then p, (p. 149). (The corresponding 
elimination rule is also valid.) 
(m) The (central) constitutive principle for ascending truth is the following enquotational principle: 
If p (and a sentence S says that p) then S is ascending true, (p. 149). (The corresponding introduction 
rule is also valid.)13
(n) The predicate “is descending true”  behaves (very) roughly like “is necessarily true”, while “is 
ascending true”  behaves (very) roughly like “is possibly true”. 
(o) However, descending truth is not closed under validity or replacement of logical equivalents. 
(Background: validity is not necessary truth-preservation for Scharp (pp. 149-152, pp. 172-3) 
following the lead of Field (2006).)
(p) A sentence S is safe if and only if: if S is ascending true then S is descending true. So, S is unsafe if 
and only if S is ascending but not descending true, (pp. 152-153).
(q) Liar-like sentences, and their negations, are unsafe (pp. 173-177). So, liar sentences, and their 
negations, are ascending true, but not descending true. 
(r) The descending liar paradox (which invokes the descending liar identity DL = “DL is not 
descending true”) is blocked because descending truth does not validate the following 
enquotational principle: if p (and a sentence S says that p) then S is descending true, (pp. 173-4). 
(The corresponding introduction rule is also not valid.)      
(s) The ascending liar paradox (which invokes the ascending liar identity AL = “AL is not ascending 
true”) is blocked because ascending truth does not validate the following disquotational principle: 
If S is ascending true (and S says that p) then p, (pp. 173-4). (The corresponding elimination rule is 
also not valid.)
(t) The upshot is that classical logic is preserved in the replacement language; the replacement 
language is semantically closed; there are no strengthened liars (pp. 169-177).
 ADT has other constitutive principles (e.g. “S” is not ascending/descending true if and only if 13
“not-S” is ascending/descending true) but these are less central or derivative or both (p. 154).
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(u) Descending truth takes over truth’s role as a device for (indirect) endorsement. Ascending truth 
takes over truth’s role as a device for (indirect) rejection (p. 174). This is what makes the proposal a 
Bi-Replacement Strategy.14
(v) The replacement concepts also feature in the constitutive principles for: predication, reference, 
validity, meaning, assertion, provability, and kindred concepts (Ch. 8).  
(w) For Scharp, a theory of truth not only has a prescriptive part but a descriptive part. The former 
is the replacement theory of ascending and descending truth; the latter is an account of what we 
were doing all along when using “true”.
(x) For the descriptive theory, Scharp invokes Truth-Relativism and treats “is true” as assessment-
sensitive. This descriptive theory employs the replacement notions and thus the prescriptive theory 
is prior to the descriptive theory (Ch. 9).15
3. Three Initial Questions.
One of the most interesting features of Replacing Truth is the metaphilosophy which underpins the 
whole project. A tantalising glimpse of this metaphilosophy is revealed in the following remarks: 
My view is that philosophy is, for the most part, the study of inconsistent concepts [...] Once 
enough progress has been made to arrive at a set of relatively consistent concepts for some 
subject matter, it gets outsourced as a science (Scharp 2013, p. 3).
But these remarks raise three immediate problems:
Problem One: The replacement methodology on offer could be seen as a description of past (good) 
philosophical practice or it could itself be seen as a prescription for solving philosophical problems 
by replacing them. The first interpretation seems to be false. A great deal of extant philosophy has 
 There is a serious worry whether the descending/ascending truth-predicates can function as 14
devices for generalised endorsement/rejection respectively. For example, consider the claim: every 
claim in Scharp's book is descending true. Here we are using the descending truth predicate to record 
our assent to all the claims made in Replacing Truth. One of these claims is: the descending liar sentence 
is not descending true. (Indeed, this sentence is a theorem of ADT.) Since I endorse this sentence, and 
descending truth is the device for endorsement, then I am committed to: “the descending liar sentence 
is not descending true” is descending true. But this claim quickly gives rise to paradox. (Cf. Scharp's 
discussion on pp. 286-7.) This is arguably just an instance of a more general worry that descending 
truth and ascending truth cannot, after all, function as consistent devices for endorsement and 
rejection, respectively. Scharp (pp. 280-1) acknowledges this worry but replies that “[...] there is no 
such thing as a consistent device for endorsement. Descending truth is as close as one can get 
without having an inconsistent concept” (p. 281). In effect, the concept of endorsement needs 
replacing with a new concept endorsement*. Likewise, rejection needs replacing with rejection*. (It 
would have been useful to have seen this aspect of the theory spelt out in a bit more detail.)         
 This seems to be a key virtue of Scharp’s view because if truth is defective then how can it be used 15
to give a semantic theory for itself? (pp. 134-5).
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been conducted in a descriptive vein. The latter interpretation reveals some of the Marxist 
credentials of the project: philosophy needs to change in order to make progress. Which 
interpretation does Scharp have in mind? (I presume the latter.)
Problem Two: Concepts can be defective in manifold ways. They can be intensionally defective: 
incomplete, confused, unsatisfiable, or even incoherent/inconsistent. They can be extensionally 
defective: too inclusive, too narrow, empty, or divided of reference. They can be too complex, too 
simple, too unspecific, or too vague. They can be too parochial or too elitist. They can be redundant 
or not fit to feature in any useful explanation. They can be superseded, hackneyed, or systematically 
misapplied. They can be loaded with ideological baggage or serve as ongoing devices for deceit, 
discrimination, or oppression. Given all this, conceptual incoherence is just one source of conceptual 
malfunction, and perhaps not the most prevalent or interesting source. So, why take philosophy to 
be mainly concerned with concepts which are defective in only one way—by being incoherent?  16
Problem Three: Even if a replacement methodology for philosophy is called for, then philosophy will 
be concerned to offer replacement concepts across a wide variety of domains, both scientific and 
non-scientific. Take the concept of responsibility. If philosophy is in the business of replacing this 
concept with a better one, then we would surely pass the replacement on to legal theory (and 
related domains of study), and not to science. Likewise if the concepts of right, law, artwork, family, 
convention, freedom, for example, are to be replaced then we would not outsource the replacements to 
the branches of science. In other words, Scharp’s replacement methodology, as stated, has some 
significant baggage: scientism. Does Scharp really conceive of philosophy in the Quinean tradition 
as the mere handmaiden to science or will he allow a more inclusive view?      17
4. Deflationism and Replacement.
Who can avail themselves of Conceptual Marxism? Not everybody, thinks Scharp. In particular, it is 
not available to the deflationist. He says (2013, p. 281):
The replacement strategy depends on truth’s explanatory role—otherwise there is no reason 
to replace truth. So, deflationists have no reason to accept this view.
 Scharp invokes Blackburn’s phrase “conceptual engineering” to describe either a revisionary 16
(light-duty) or replacement (“heavy-duty”, p. 11) methodology for defective concepts (see 
Blackburn 2001, pp. 1-2; Scharp, p. 11). But even given this, Scharp has a far too restricted view of 
what Conceptual Engineering should be. For a general assessment of Conceptual Engineering, see 
my “Conceptual Engineering Without Concepts (and Without Engineering).”
 Cf. Strawson (2011) on two conceptions of philosophy. Quine (1960) wanted to replace the 17
traditional notion of synonymy (and with it the notions of meaning and analyticity) with what he 
took to be the scientifically respectable notion of stimulus-synonymy (though Quine did not believe 
in concepts in anything like there traditional sense). Replacing Truth seems to be written in a very 
Quinean spirit (see esp. Ch. 7). 
 6
Problem Four: Suppose one thinks that truth has an expressive but no explanatory role: truth is 
simply a device of disquotation, enquotation, and generalisation as encoded in the Tarskian T-
schema for truth (and cognate schemas). Such is deflationism about truth. However, suppose the 
deflationist thinks that this device over-reaches: it doesn’t do well when it comes to a range of 
paradoxical sentences such as the liar sentence. In the face of such paradox, one live option is to 
replace this device with a pair of devices, namely ascending and descending truth, together with the 
predicates “is ascending true”, “is descending true”. These replacement predicates, following 
Scharp, are fit to perform the expressive roles of the original truth-predicate. However, given 
deflationism, they are not fit for substantial philosophy theory—but that ought not to be a necessary 
condition for a replacement methodology. So, this seems to me to represent a perfectly coherent 
deflationary form of Conceptual Marxism. So, why exactly does Scharp think that a replacement 
strategy is inimical to deflationism?
5. Individuating Concepts.
What are concepts and how should we individuate them? The official line in Replacing Truth is that a 
replacement strategy is largely neutral on the metaphysics of concepts.  However, it’s hard to see 18
how such neutrality can be upheld. Indeed, it would seem that the replacement strategy on offer is 
knee-deep in metaphysical commitments. In particular, it is clear, though not I think explicitly 
stated, that Scharp’s Conceptual Marxism is committed to something like the following 
individuation principle:
Concept Identity Principle: Concepts are individuated by their constitutive principles.19
So, if two concepts differ in respect of their (central) constitutive principles, then they are different 
concepts.  For example, if one concept has a truth-introduction rule as one of its central constitutive 20
principles and another concept lacks such a rule then these cannot be the same concept. This is just 
why, for example, truth and ascending truth are different concepts. This has to be so for Scharp’s 
replacement strategy to get off the ground in the first place.
Problem Five: Whether or not one accepts the Concept Identity Principle will be greatly influenced 
by the stand one takes on what kind of thing concepts are, where they live, and how they survive. 
Suppose concepts are three-dimensional enduring entities. Suppose further that a concept can 
 Concepts might be abilities or capacities, mental representations, or abstract objects (see Scharp p.18
35). Scharp is happy to be non-neutral about the epistemology of concepts—specifically their 
possession conditions.
 Scharp is, I think, also committed to mereological essentialism for concepts: if a concept x has 19
some constitutive principle y as a part then x essentially has y as a part.
 I assume a difference in a peripheral constitutive principle need not make for a difference in 20
concept.
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persist through a significant revision to one or more of its core constitutive principles.  Then the 21
Concept Identity Principle is false. In effect, Scharp (implicitly) assumes that an endurantist view of 
concepts is wrong. Equally, one might take concepts to be four-dimensional perduring entities with 
temporal parts, where these temporal parts are composed of different sets of constitutive principles. 
On such a view, the Concept Identity Principle needs re-working such that a concept is individuated 
by its temporal parts, and temporal parts are individuated via the set of constitutive principles true 
of the concept in question at a particular time. Scharp (implicitly) rejects such a perdurantist view 
since it permits conceptual persistence through a perdurantist conception of change—namely, 
whereby the concept is an aggregate of temporal parts, where these parts may be composed of 
different sets of (core) constitutive principles.22
The problem for Scharp, then, is not so much that he is far from neutral on the metaphysics 
of concepts, but rather that he does not address the arguments for or against the various ways in 
which concepts are to be individuated. This is no mere quibble. It lies as the heart as to whether 
incoherent concepts call for mere conceptual revision (light-duty Conceptual Engineering) or for the 
much more radical Marxist methodology of conceptual replacement (heavy-duty Conceptual 
Engineering). Conceptual revision of truth, in one prominent form at least, would involve mere 
replacement of the constitutive principles for the concept of truth, but the concept itself could 
survive such revisions, and we can thus continue using the same concept-word to pick out the 
revised concept—even if the revision is of a core principle.  The replacement strategy, meanwhile, 23
entails that such revision means that we are dealing with a new concept—that much is guaranteed 
by the Concept Identity Principle, to be picked out by a new concept word. But why think that? Just 
as words can survive substantial changes in their meaning, then why cannot concepts survive 
substantial changes in their (core) constitutive principles? 
6. Provability.
Just how radical is Scharp’s replacement strategy? Very. Far more radical than is acknowledged in 
Replacing Truth. This is revealed when we consider the relationship between the concept of truth 
and other concepts such as provability, assertion, belief, knowledge, and more. Take the concept of 
 To make sense of such a view, one might well time-index the set of constitutive principles. On 21
such a view, the Concept Identity Principle is now valid when stated as follows: concepts are 
individuated via their time-indexed sets of constitutive principles. This form of endurantism is also 
(implicitly) rejected by Scharp because it permits conceptual persistence through a kind of change—
being composed of the time t1 set of time constitutive principles, and being composed of the time t2 
set of constitutive principles.
 Cf. Kaplan (1990) on the metaphysics of words.22
 If conceptual revision is all that is called for then the title of Kevin’s book would be the rather 23
more humdrum: Replacing the Constitutive Principles for Truth (but Keeping the Concept of Truth and the 
Predicate "is true”). See below.
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(informal) proof and (informal) provability. With respect to these notions, Scharp recommends that 
we replace the following constitutive principle connecting provability and truth:24
(P1) If “S” is provable then “S” is true
with:
(P2) If “S” is provable with “S” is ascending true.25
Problem Six: Principle P1 is a constitutive principle for provability. To replace this principle with P2, 
while keeping the concept of provability unchanged, is to be engaged with conceptual revision and 
not conceptual replacement, as we have just seen. The Concept Identity Principle enforces the result 
that to replace P1 with P2 means that we are now dealing with a different concept of provability. 
Crucially, we are not allowed to use the word “provable” to pick out this new concept, so we have 
to introduce some new vocabulary to refer to it. So, the replacement principle should in fact be:
(P3) If “S” is provable1 then “S” is ascending true,
where “provable1” picks out the replacement concept of provability.  This begins to reveal how 26
extreme Conceptual Marxism really is: replace the concept of truth and you must also replace the 
concept of provability, and indeed you must also replace the word “provable” too. Does Scharp 
acknowledge that this is an unavoidable feature of his view, a feature which shows that the view is 
more radical than the view officially advertised in Replacing Truth?
7. Belief, Assertion, Correct Belief, and Correct Assertion. 
The revolutionary nature of Conceptual Marxism does not stop there. Scharp offers the following 
replacement principles for belief, assertion, correct belief, and correct assertion (p. 207, pp. 215-16):
(AB1) An assertion/belief that p is ascending true if things are as they are asserted/believed to be 
(with respect to this assertion/belief). 
(AB2) An assertion/belief that p is descending true only if things are as they as they are assertion/
believed to be (with respect to this assertion/belief).
(AB3) It is correct to assert/believe that p only if p is ascending true.
(AB4) It is correct to assert/believe that p if p is descending true.
 See p. 205.24
 Scharp cannot use Descending Truth as here as that would quickly leads to contradiction given 25
that the Descending Liar Sentence is provable on no assumptions.
 Indeed, the new concept may not be a concept of provability at all, just as ascending and 26
descending truth are not concepts of truth but surrogates for truth. 
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Problem Seven: However, by Scharp’s lights, these cannot be the right replacement principles for 
(correct) assertion/belief. That is because, again, the Concept Identity Principle enforces the result 
that to replace a constitutive principle for a concept is to replace the concept. So, we can no longer 
use the same concept-word to pick out the new replacement concept. So, Scharp’s replacement 
principles should be:
(AB5) An assertion1/belief1 that p is ascending true if things are as they are asserted1/believed1 to 
be. 
(AB6) An assertion1/belief1 that p is descending true only if things are as they are asserted1/
believed1 to be .
(AB7) It is correct to assert1/believe1 that p only if p is ascending true.
(AB8) It is correct to assert1/believe1 that p if p is descending true,
where “assertion1” and “belief1” pick out the replacement concepts for assertion and belief, 
respectively. Surely Scharp is committed to the more radical revision resulting in AB5-8, rather than 
AB1-4?
Problem Eight: The general lesson ought to be clear. If we replace the concept of truth with one or 
more surrogate concepts then any concept which is constitutively linked to truth via one of its core 
constitutive principles must be replaced too. Furthermore, we cannot use the old concept-word to 
pick out this new concept—we must introduce a new concept-word to refer to it. The problem is 
that not only is the concept of truth constitutively linked to the concepts of provability, assertion, 
and belief, it is also so linked to myriad other concepts such as the concepts of inquiry, objectivity, 
reality, knowledge, judgment, evidence, justification, confirmation, probability, fact, being, truth-
value, truth-bearer, reference, denotation, satisfaction, truth-condition, meaning, content, 
proposition, representation, necessity, possibility, contingency, and more. In turn these concepts are 
constitutively linked to a wider class of concepts which may well include, in the end, all concepts of 
central philosophical interest. All these concepts must be replaced too, together with their respective 
concept-words. The problem faced by Scharp thus proliferates very quickly. Again, this not only 
makes the view much more radical than the advertised view in Replacing Truth, it begins to make 
the view implausible. Would it not be better to ditch the Concept Identity Principle altogether and 
go for a less extreme replacement strategy whereby we can keep the old concept and the old 
concept-word, but merely replace the constitutive principles? Surely we should explore a more 
moderate left-wing option first before trying out the wholesale conceptual cleansing recommended 
by Scharp? (See below.)
8. The Scope Problem: the Case of Vagueness.
Scharp’s replacement strategy for incoherent concepts only becomes a genuine contender when we 
are given an account of how it would play out with respect to concepts other than truth but which, 
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by Scharp’s lights, are incoherent concepts that prove to be the source of philosophical paradox. 
What would a replacement strategy for vagueness look like? Here we can adapt the account of 
vagueness given by Eklund (2002a). The rough idea would be that one of the core constitutive 
principle for the vague concept yellow would be a principle of tolerance as follows:
(TOL): For all x, if x is yellow then x’ is yellow,
(where x’ is the successor of x in a sorites series). TOL plus the fact that the first patch in the series is 
yellow, and the last is not, entail a contradiction, at least given some suitably strong logic. Since TOL 
is highly plausible, and the logic initially seems to be in good order, we have a paradox. Eklund’s 
response to this paradox is to hold that TOL is a constitutive principle for the concept yellow and 
that TOL is false—that just why the concept yellow is an incoherent concept since it is governed by 
constitutive principles which jointly entail something false.  27
Problem Nine: The replacement version of Eklund’s view would resolve the sorites paradox via 
conceptual replacement. However, to effect such a replacement, the principle TOL would have to be 
replaced with some principle which was suitably weakened so as not to give rise to the paradox.  28
Moreover, such a replacement principle would ensure that we are no longer dealing with the 
concept yellow, but a new concept—to be picked out by a new concept-word such as “yellow1”. So 
much is enforced by the Concept Identity Principle. But then in order to address the sorites paradox 
in English, we need to replace every single vague concept with a new concept, and replace every 
single vague predicate in English with a new predicate which picks out this new concept. Unlike the 
liar paradox, which only arises when we formulate a liar sentence, vagueness is ubiquitous in 
natural language. So the required replacements are not simply limited to some special region of 
thought and talk. Upshot: once Conceptual Marxism is applied to vagueness the result is an even 
more extreme kind of conceptual cleansing. Scharp is then faced with a dilemma: either treat 
vagueness differently from how he treats the liar paradox and kindred paradoxes (and face a charge 
of ad hocness) or treat vagueness via his Conceptual Marxism (and face a charge of wholesale 
conceptual cleansing). Which horn of the dilemma will he take?
9. The Knower Paradox.
Is the concept of knowledge incoherent? Scharp’s (final) analysis of knowledge is: S knows that p if 
and only if S believes p, S is justified in believing that p, and p. Since this analysis does not employ 
truth then it does not need replacement as it stands.  However, one version of the knower paradox 29
 One attraction of such a view is that it preserves classical logic.27
 One extra worry here is: what would the replacement principle of tolerance look like and could 28
ordinary users of English deploy it successfully? (See the worries raised by Dummett 1975.) One 
candidate principle might be a contextualised form of the tolerance principle whereby adjacent 
patches are never category different—at least when viewed together (see Raffman 1994; cf. Graff-
Fara 2000). I eagerly await Scharp’s book Replacing Tolerance to see how the view pans out!
 Setting aside issues which arise from Gettier cases.29
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of Kaplan and Montague (1960) surely shows that knowledge is an incoherent concept, if truth is.  30
A Scharp-style replacement strategy for the knower paradox would involve replacement of one, or 
more, of the constitutive principles for knowledge. The two main culprits in the proof are a factivity 
principle and a necessitation rule (assuming the logic is in good order):
(K-Fact): ⊢ If “S” is known then S. 
(K-Nec)  From ⊢ S  infer ⊢ “S” is known.31
What kind of replacement solutions are available to Scharp? Consider the following two options:
Option One: (i) Retain K-Nec. (ii) Invoke Scharp’s replacement theory of truth, specifically ascending 
truth, and replace K-Fact with:
(K1-Fact) ⊢ If S is known then S is ascending true.
Without K-Fact, the knower is blocked. (And we cannot derive K-Fact from K1-Fact, as ascending 
truth does not validate a descending truth-elimination rule.)
Option Two: (i) Retain K-Fact. (ii) Invoke Scharp’s replacement theory of truth, specifically 
descending truth, and replace K-Nec with:
(K1-Nec) From ⊢ “S” is descending true infer ⊢ “S” is known.
Without K-Nec, the knower is blocked. (And we cannot derive K-Nec from K1-Nec, as descending 
truth does not validate necessitation for descending truth.)
However, neither of these options is available to Scharp given his commitment to the Concept 
Identity Principle: as we have seen, to replace a core constitutive principle for knowledge, is to 
replace the concept of knowledge and so one needs a new concept-word to pick out this new 
concept.  Scharp can, however, avail himself of one of the following two options:32
Option Three: A Mono-Replacement Strategy whereby the concept of knowledge is replaced with the 
concept of knowledge1 which has the constitutive principles:
(K2-Fact) If “S” is known1 then S is ascending true. 
 Scharp, fn. 20, p. 216 says “it might well be”.30
 Proof: Suppose “k is not known” is known. By K-Fact, k is not known. But from this same 31
supposition, given k = “k is not known”, via substitution, k is known. Contradiction. Conclude, via 
reductio: “k is not known” is not known. Via a further application of substitution, we can then 
derive: k is not known. Since this is rigorously provable on no assumptions, then we can also 
derive, via K-Nec, that “k is not known” is known. Contradiction. 
 Scharp cannot adopt a hybrid strategy whereby some concepts get replaced and other concepts 32
get revised—so much is enforced by the Concept Identity Principle.
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(K2-Nec) From ⊢ S infer ⊢ “S” is known1.
Option Four: A Mono-Replacement Strategy whereby the concept of knowledge is replaced with the 
concept of knowledge2 which has the constitutive principles:
(K3-Fact) If “S” is known2  then S.
(K3-Nec) From ⊢ “S” is descending true S infer ⊢ “S” is known2.
Here “known1” and “known2” pick out new surrogate concepts for knowledge. 
Finally, as it turns out, Scharp  could seek to address the knower paradox via a Bi-Replacement 
Strategy, as follows:
Option Five: Just as with truth (and reference and predication), there is a Bi-Replacement Strategy 
whereby we have: two replacement concepts, namely Ascending Knowledge and Descending 
Knowledge. The core constitutive principle for descending knowledge is:
(K4-Fact) If “S” is  descending known then S.
The core constitutive principle for Ascending Knowledge is:
(K4-Nec) From ⊢ S infer ⊢ “S” is ascending known.
This option differs from the previous two options because it does not invoke the concepts of 
ascending or descending truth.33
Problem Ten: Which of these three options should Scharp choose? Given that he already has the 
concepts of ascending truth and descending truth in hand to address the liar paradox, then it looks 
as if one of the Mono-Replacement strategies is the better option. The thought here is that a kind of 
maxim of minimal mutilation is in play: revise or replace as little as possible so as to save what can 
be saved of truth (and logic). Upshot: even though we need two new concepts to solve the liar, we 
don’t need two new replacement concepts for knowledge to solve the knower (once we have two 
new replacement concepts for truth). Still, a residual problem remains: which of Option Three and 
Option Four are we to choose, and why?
I don’t think is too much of a challenge since Conceptual Marxism should probably allow that 
sometimes replacement options can be equally good. Nonetheless, this worry opens up the question 
as to whether, once the maxim of minimal mutilation is on the table, we should be looking for a 
viable replacement strategy for truth which is less disruptive than a Scharp-style Bi-Replacement 
strategy. Let’s see.
 It’s worth noting that, on a Scharpian view, just as ascending truth and descending truth are not 33
kinds of truth or new ways of thinking about truth (despite their names), all these replacement 
concepts for knowledge are not kinds of knowledge or even new ways of thinking about knowledge 
(despite their names). 
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10. Overkill.
Both Eklund (2002a) and Scharp (2013) take the liar paradox to show the T-schema to be (in some 
sense) invalid, where the T-schema may be given as: S is true if and only if p (where S says that p). 
However, we only need to reject (or indeed restrict) one direction of the T-schema in order to block 
the liar paradox. Eklund (2002a) does not tell us which direction we should reject (or restrict). 
Perhaps he thinks we should reject both directions.  That is arguably a kind of overkill because the 34
maxim of minimal mutilation counsels us to save what can be saved of the old theory of truth. So, if 
we can save one direction in the face of the liar paradox, then we should do so. Scharp meanwhile 
adopts a similar stance since neither direction of the T-schema for truth is preserved in his theory. 
Rather, as we have seen, the two directions of the T-schema are replaced with the the introduction-
rule for ascending truth, and the elimination rule for descending truth. Likewise, this is also 
arguably a kind of overkill because we only need to reject one direction of the T-schema to block the 
paradox—and so we only need to find one surrogate replacement principle to have a stable theory.  35
We can do this in either of the following ways:
Option One: Reject the truth-elimination rule for truth and with it the following direction of the T-
schema: If S is true then p (where S says that p). Introduce a new concept—descending truth—which 
has an elimination rule (but not an introduction rule) which can play the role that truth's 
elimination rule played as a device for (indirect) assent, as when one says, e.g., “what she said was 
true”.
Option Two: Reject the truth-introduction rule for truth and with it the following direction of the T-
schema: if p then S is true (where S says that p). Introduce a new concept—ascending truth—which 
has an introduction rule (but not an elimination rule) which can replace the role that truth's 
introduction rule played as a device for (indirect) denial, as when one says, e.g., “what he said what 
not true”. 
Problem Eleven: Which of these options should Scharp choose between? As it turns out, neither. Why 
is that? You've guessed it—it’s because of our old friend The Concept Identity Principle. Once the 
elimination-rule for truth has been replaced, we are no longer dealing with the concept of truth. 
Likewise, for the introduction rule. In other words, there is no Mono-Replacement Strategy 
available not only for the concept of truth, but for the constitutive principles for truth. That's why 
Scharp's Conceptual Marxism is inevitably extreme—at least in so far as The Concept Identity 
Principle is taken to be inevitable. So, on pain of repetition, we may ask again: Is this Principle so 
inevitable? 
 
 I'll come back to this below. 34
 Of course the liar paradox can be derived in different ways—so the issue is a bit more 35
complicated. See below. 
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15. The Asymmetry of Truth-Introduction and Truth-Elimination.
We have just seen how there is a much weaker replacement strategy available which does not 
involve replacing the concept of truth, but rather involves weakening, but keeping, the concept of 
truth and also invoking a new additional concept to make up for that weakness. Suppose, unlike 
Scharp, one were attracted to such a view. The question still remains: which of the two options 
canvassed above should be preferred? One thought might be that since the truth-introduction and 
truth-elimination rules are on a par in terms of plausibility then if we reject one rule, we must, by 
symmetry, reject the other. That would result in neither option being available and a Scharp-style Bi-
Replacement Strategy would in the end be called for. However, such a symmetry argument is not 
available to Scharp for two reasons. Firstly, any prescriptive, replacement methodology should 
allow that we are simply free to choose how to replace the constitutive principles for truth in the 
event of a tie between two equi-plausible replacement strategies. We saw as much when it came to 
the kind of Mono-Replacement Strategy for replacing the concept of knowledge above. Secondly, 
the truth-introduction rule and truth-elimination rule, as it turns out, are asymmetrical on 
completely independent grounds. So, anybody wishing to restrict, revise, or replace the concept of 
truth, in the face of the liar paradox, can only do so in only one way.  Why is that?36
In the literature on the liar paradox, there has been far too much focus on two types of 
formulation. One formulation focusses on the T-schema and its liar-instance: “L is not true” is true if 
and only if L is not true. The other formulation proceeds as follows: suppose the L is true. By 
substitution, “L is not true” is true. By truth-elimination, L is not true. Contradiction. Via reductio 
on the initial supposition, we may infer that L is not true. By truth-introduction, “L is not true” is 
true. Via substitution, conclude that L is true. Contradiction. The latter formulation is to be 
preferred because it is more explicit and does not depend on the T-schema but simply on the 
corresponding elimination and introduction rules. More generally, the most important versions of 
any paradox are those which use the weakest resources. That's because such versions present us 
with the clearest picture as to what are the candidate basic sources of the malady.37
 A better, and indeed perhaps canonical, formulation of the liar paradox does not employ the 
rule of truth-introduction at all but simply an Alethic Rule of Necessitation as follows:
(T-Nec):  From ⊢ S infer ⊢ “S” is true.
The proof then goes as follows: Suppose that “L is not true” is true. Given truth-elimination we can 
infer that L is not true. Given that L = “L is not true”, and substitution, we can also infer from our 
 This lesson applies to those such as Horwich (1990) who recommend we restrict the T-schema to 36
its unproblematic instances in order to combat the liar paradox. What Horwich should be doing is 
merely restricting one direction of the T-schema (given a plausible maxim of minimal mutilation). 
Likewise the same applies to Eklund (2002a). More generally, I do not think the lesson advanced in 
the main text has been generally discussed or understood.  
 Of course, we can’t always decide in advance which of a variety candidate presentations of a 37
paradox employs the weakest set of principles because it is often a controversial matter as to 
whether one set of principles is weaker than some other set.
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initial supposition that L is true. Contradiction. By reductio, infer that “L is not true” is not true. 
Another step of substitution gives us: L is not true. Using T-Nec, we can infer that “L is not true” is 
true. Contradiction on no assumptions.38
This represents a weaker, and so better, formulation of the liar paradox than the formulation 
which uses truth-introduction and truth-elimination because T-Nec is weaker than truth-
introduction—and so merely restricting (or rejecting) the latter but not the former is insufficient to 
block the liar paradox. Upshot: insofar as truth-elimination and truth-introduction are relevantly 
symmetrical, then truth-elimination and T-Nec are relevantly asymmetrical because the latter is 
weaker than truth-introduction. So, if we were to reject or restrict either truth-elimination or T-Nec, 
it should be the truth-elimination rule. But then if that is so, then given the maxim of minimal 
mutilation, we should preserve not only T-Nec but the truth-introduction rule too. Our question has 
thus been answered: we should prefer Option One sketched above.
Final Problem: In other words, if one is tempted by some kind of replacement strategy, and 
constrained by a maxim of minimal mutilation, then one should seriously consider ditching the 
Concept Identity Principle so as to allow the following constellation of claims: keep the concept of 
truth in troublesome contexts; keep the word “true” in troublesome contexts; keep the constitutive 
principle of truth-introduction (and the alethic principle of necessitation T-Nec); but revise the 
concept of truth so it no longer validates a rule of truth-elimination; finally, use a replacement 
concept—namely, descending truth—to function as a surrogate concept, equipped to function as a 
device for (indirect) assent.  Surely this represent a less extreme, and more attractive proposal than 39
the Bi-Replacement strategy offered in Replacing Truth?    40 41
 For simplicity, I'm assuming that L = “L is not true” is a theorem.38
 Cf. Friedman and Sheard (1987).39
 My own view is that one viable solution to the liar paradox takes pretty much the shape just 40
outlined, with one crucial difference: there is no need to view such a solution as representing any 
kind of replacement solution at all. How so? Well, the concept of truth does not need to be revised 
because it all along failed to validate a truth-elimination rule—it’s just that we did not realise this. 
What is in need of revision is not the concept of truth, but our beliefs about what such a concept 
includes. Making good on that proposal, however, would take us too far afield—see Greenough ms 
"The Lazy Way with the Liar Paradox".
 Versions of this material were presented at a session on Conceptual Engineering, Arché Graduate 41
Conference, November 2014; Northern Institute for Philosophy, Aberdeen, December 2014; and at a 
Symposium on Replacing Truth, Eastern APA, Philadelphia, December 2014. Many thanks to the 
audiences and speakers at those events for very useful feedback—particularly JC Beall, Herman 
Cappelen, Toby Meadows, and Crispin Wright. Thanks also to my MLitt Class on the Philosophy of 
Logic, Autumn 2014, for much stimulating discussion of Replacing Truth. Particular thanks to Kevin 
Scharp for very valuable feedback on earlier versions.
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